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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Michael Rowe Russo challenges his convictions for rape, kidnapping and
burglary.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
J.W. woke up to find Russo, wearing a mask, in her bedroom. (Trial Tr.,
vol. I, p. 208, L. 18 - p. 210, L. 2.1) Russo put a pillow over J.W.'s face and a
knife to her neck. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 210, Ls. 3-7.) After securing J.W.'s promise
to not scream, Russo pulled off her sweats and used the knife to cut off her top.
(Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 210, Ls. 8-17.) Russo then undid his own pants and put on a
condom.

(Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 210, Ls. 17-18.) Russo put J.W.'s thighs up and

penetrated her vagina with his penis. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 210, L. 18 - p. 211, L.
11.) Russo then straddled her chest, instructed J.W. to open her mouth, and put
his penis in her mouth. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 211, L. 23 - p. 212, L. 14.) Russo
moved J.W. to the edge of the bed and again raped her vaginally. (Trial Tr., vol.
I, p. 213, L. 6 - p. 214, L. 6.)
During the second vaginal penetration, J.W., although still having her face
covered by the pillow, heard Russo open his cell phone, could see its light come
on, and could hear Russo taking pictures.

(Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 214, Ls. 7-15.)

Russo then pulled her hair, slapped her, rolled her over to her hands and knees,

1 The trial transcript is in three volumes:
"Vol. I" contains trial proceedings on
August 2 and 3, 2010 and a hearing from April 22, 2010, "Vol. II" contains trial
proceedings on August 4, 2010, and "Vol. III" contains trial proceedings on
August 5, 2010. All other citations to transcripts in this brief will be by date.
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and penetrated her vagina a third time. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 214, L. 16 - p. 215, L.
7.) J.W. again heard him take a picture. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 215, Ls. 7-8.)
Russo next had J.W. get off the bed and get on her knees on the floor.
(Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 215, Ls. 18-22.) Keeping her eyes covered with his hand,
Russo penetrated her mouth with his penis a second time. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p.
215, Ls. 22-25.)

Russo then had the victim get her own lubricant from her

bathroom at knife point and, using the lubricant, penetrated her vagina with his
penis a fourth time. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 215, L. 25 - p. 217, L. 2.) Russo then
penetrated her anus with his penis. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 217, Ls. 2-3.)
After that Russo got up on top of the bed with the victim, penetrated her
vagina again, but this time "harder, so it kind of hurt." (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 218, L.
23 - p. 219, L. 2.)

He told her, "This is for two-and-a-half years ago.

You

wouldn't give me the time of day." (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 219, Ls. 2-4.) Russo then
turned on the bedroom light, had the victim get on all fours, and penetrated her
vagina for the fifth time. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 219, Ls. 10-14.) After Russo left her
apartment J.W. called the police from a neighbor's, because Russo had disabled
her phone. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 220, L. 1 - p. 221, L. 2.)
A grand jury indicted Russo for rape, kidnapping and burglary. (R., vol. I,
pp. 10-12; vol. II, pp. 259-64.) Prior to trial, the prosecution moved for admission
under I.R.E. 404(b) of evidence of prior bad acts including other rapes and
possession of rape fantasy pornography to show identity, motive, modus
operandi, intent, and plan, and to give context to why police immediately
suspected Russo of being the rapist.

(R., vol. I, pp. 44-72, 85-88.)
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Russo

objected.

(R., vol. I, pp. 81-84.)

The district court excluded most of the

evidence, but did allow some evidence regarding Russo's statements about his
own sexual fantasies made in a police interview and his possession of
pornography depicting rapes. (R., vol. II, pp. 175-76,243; 3/18/10 Tr., p. 62, L. 8
- p. 79, L. 17.)
Russo moved to suppress "aI/ evidence obtained during a warrantless
search of his person," among other evidence. (R., vol. I, pp. 73-80.) The state
objected. (R., vol. I, pp. 100-59.) The district court denied this motion. (R., vol.
II, p.166; 1/27/10 Tr., p. 52, L.13-p.103, L. 7.)
The matter proceeded to trial where Russo was convicted as charged.
(R., vol. III, pp. 367-70; Trial Tr., vol. III, p. 5, L. 5 - p. 6, L. 11.) The district court

imposed concurrent sentences of fixed life, life with 40 years fixed and 10 years
fixed, for rape, kidnapping and burglary, respectively. (R., pp. 413-414.) Russo
timely appealed from the judgment. (R., vol. III, pp. 415, 418-21, 437-41.)
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ISSUES
Russo states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err in failing to suppress the video
discovered by police in an unconstitutional search of Mr.
Russo's cell phone?

2.

Did the district court err in admitting irrelevant, highly
prejudicial evidence concerning Mr. Russo's deviant sexual
interests?

(Appellant's brief, p. 11.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Russo failed to show any error in the district court's determination that
searching him and seizing his cell phone did not violate his rights against
unreasonable search and seizure?

2.

Has Russo failed to show error in the district court's ruling admitting
evidence that Russo fantasized about rape and possessed pornography
depicting rapes?
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ARGUMENT
/.
Russo Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That
Searching Him And Seizing His Cell Phone Did Not Violate Russo's Rights
Against Unreasonable Search And Seizure
A.

Introduction
The district court found the following facts relevant to the suppression

motion. Russo left the victim's apartment in Nampa at approximately 4:57 a.m.,
and the victim reported the crimes to the police shortly thereafter. (1/27/10 Tr., p.
54, Ls. 2-9; p. 74, Ls. 2-5.) The victim reported "that during the course of this
event that she believed she heard a camera from a cell phone going off ... as
though the person raping her was taking photos of the rape." (1/27/10 Tr., p. 53,
Ls. 1-15.) By 5:30 a.m. the police suspected Russo, primarily because he was
the subject of investigation in relation to other rapes and sexual assaults.
(1/27/10 Tr., p. 55, Ls. 2-25; p. 74, Ls. 5-8.) At about 5:47 a.m. the first police
officer arrived outside Russo's apartment and determined that the engine of
Russo's motorcycle was still hot from recent use. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 55, L. 23 - p.
56, L. 10; p. 57, L. 15 - p. 58, L. 6; p. 74, Ls. 12-17.) Police shortly after that
started surveillance of Russo's apartment. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 74, Ls. 8-11.) Starting
at around 6:00 officers saw Russo making several trips to a laundry room near
his four-plex apartment where he started doing laundry, including clothing
matching the description provided by the victim of clothing worn by the rapist.
(1/27/10 Tr., p. 72, L. 11 - p. 73, L. 1.)
Police began the process of applying for a search warrant for Russo's
apartment and motorcycle at about 10:00 a.m. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 59, Ls. 2-11; p.
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74, Ls. 22-23.) Police saw Russo leave the apartment and walking around at
about 11:00. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 74, Ls. 24-25.) At about 11:10 a.m. the search
warrant was issued, and shortly thereafter the officers on the scene were
instructed to detain Russo if he left the apartment again. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 66, Ls.
20-21; p. 74, L. 25 - p. 75, L. 4.)
One of the items to be seized as evidence of the rape, pursuant to the
search warrant, was a cell phone. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 66, L. 22 - p. 67, L. 1.) About
40 minutes later, at about 11 :50 a.m., Russo again left his apartment and was
detained. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 68, Ls. 19-23; p. 75, Ls. 4-5.) Officers frisked Russo
and detected and confiscated a cell phone. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 70, Ls. 9-23; p. 75,
Ls. 5-7.) They later determined that videos or photographs of the rape of J.W.
were on the cell phone.

(1/27/10 Tr., p. 70, L. 23 - p. 71, L. 2.) Thereafter

officers obtained a second, or amended, warrant specifically authorizing a search
of the cell phone found on Russo's person (and two additional phones found in
his apartment). (1/27/10 Tr., p. 71, L. 13 - p. 72, L. 10; p. 75, Ls. 7-10.) Russo
was handcuffed and placed in a squad car immediately after the frisk and "at
some point in the process, [Russo] was formally arrested for the crimes of rape,
first-degree kidnapping and burglary" and taken to the police station for
questioning. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 70, L. 19; p. 75, Ls. 11-25.)
The district court concluded that the initial search warrant authorized the
search for and seizure of the cell phone on Russo's person and the retrieval of
evidence such as photographs of the crimes on it. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 82, Ls. 7-25.)
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Russo challenges the district court's ruling on appeal.

He argues that,

because he was not inside his residence at the time of the search that revealed
his cell phone, he was not within the scope of the search warrant. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 14-16.) He further argues that the fact officers reasonably believed he
had committed a violent felony using a knife that same morning did not justify any
frisk for weapons when they detained him. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-20.) Finally,
he argues that inevitable discovery did not justify excepting the evidence on the
cell phone from the exclusionary rule. (Appellant's brief, pp. 20-23.) Application
of the correct legal standards shows Russo's argument to be without merit. The
search of his person was, as found by the district court, within the scope of the
search warrant.

In addition, the search for the cell phone was justified as a

search incident to arrest because officers had probable cause to arrest him at the
time of his detention and search.

Finally, because Russo's arrest and search

were inevitable after execution of the search warrant even if the police had not
seized his cell phone, the inevitable discovery doctrine applies such that
suppression from any claimed illegality in the search that in fact occurred would
be inappropriate.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz,
144 Idaho 300,302, 160 P.3d 739,741 (2007).
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C.

Russo Has Failed To Show That Searching His Pockets And Taking His
Cell Phone Exceeded The Scope Of The Search Warrant
A search will exceed the scope of a search warrant "if officers search a

location not specifically described or authorized." State v. Teal, 145 Idaho 985,
989, 188 P.3d 927, 931 (Ct. App. 2008). This is so because both the Idaho and
United States constitutions require the place to be searched to be described with
particularity. kL The purpose of this requirement "is to safeguard the privacy of
citizens by insuring against the search of premises where probable cause is
lacking." State v. Yoder, 96 Idaho 651, 653, 534 P.2d 771, 773 (1975).
In accomplishing the purpose of the particularity requirement search
warrants should not be interpreted hyper-technically, but instead should be
"viewed in a commonsense and realistic fashion." Teal, 145 Idaho at 989, 188
P.3d at 931. "[P]ractical accuracy, rather than technical precision, controls the
interpretation of warrants." kL (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,
108 (1965)). A warrant to search for items that could be on the person of the
resident who is involved in the crime "authorizes the search of the resident as
reasonably and necessarily within the scope of the warrant." State v. Beals, 410
So.2d 745, 749 (La. 1982).
The search warrant issued in this case authorized the officers to search
for Russo's cell phone at the premises of his residence and on his motorcycle.
(R., vol. I, pp. 133-34.) A cell phone is undoubtedly an item that Russo may have

had on his person. Because the warrant was to search for evidence based on
probable cause that Russo was a rapist and that evidence of his crimes would be
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found on his cell phone, a search of his pockets was necessarily authorized by
the search warrant.
Russo argues that because he was detained and frisked by his mailbox
outside of the residence itself he was no longer on the premises covered by the
search warrant. (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-16.) He merely assumes, and does
not explain, how he was not on the premises allowed to be searched. 2
"When a defendant challenges a seizure, he has the burden of showing
that the items seized were beyond the scope of the warrant." State v. Fowler,
106 Idaho 3, 12, 674 P.2d 432, 441 (Ct. App. 1983).

In State v. Pierce, 137

Idaho 296,47 P.3d 1266 (Ct. App. 2002), Pierce was detained on a driveway 10
to 15 feet from the home to be searched.

~

at 297-98, 47 P.3d at 1267-68.

There was no evidence that Peirce was a resident of the home, that he had
recently entered or left the home, or that he was involved in the criminal activity
therein.

~

at 298, 47 P.3d at 1268. The Court noted the general rule that a

search warrant "implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the

occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted."

~

(emphasis

For his argument Russo relies exclusively on Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.
692 (1981), as authority for the proposition that the search here exceeded the
scope of the search warrant. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16.) In Summers,
however, the Court concluded "there is no need to reach the question whether a
search warrant for premises includes the right to search persons found there"
because the search was justified as a search incident to arrest, and was careful
to distinguish between the search and the seizure of Summers. Summers, 452
U.S. at 695 and nA. The Court did not address the scope of the premises to be
searched in that opinion other than to note that Summers was not within the
premises subject to search when he was seized. ~ at 694. Thus, there is no
analysis of why Summers' location outside the home placed him "outside the
premises described in the warrant." ~
2
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added). Because Pierce was on the premises covered by the search warrant he
was properly subject to at least a limited detention to ascertain his connection to
the premises and his potential threat to officers executing the search warrant. kL
at 298-301,47 P.3d at 1268-71.
In the present case the warrant authorized a search of the premises of
Russo's residence for Russo's cell phone, providing a specific address and
mentioning that the residence was part of a four-plex.

(R., vol. I, pp. 133-34.)

The warrant application also established probable cause that Russo was the
rapist. (R., vol. I, pp. 123-32; 1/27/10 Tr., p. 93, Ls. 4-7 ("more than substantial
evidence" to show probable cause); p. 100, Ls. 1-13.)

The evidence further

established that Russo was detained somewhere between his front door and his
mailbox. (R., vol. I, pp. 139, 142.) The facts here are virtually indistinguishable
from those in Pierce, in which the suspect was found to have been on the
premises covered by the search warrant while standing on a driveway about 10
to 15 feet from the house to be searched.

Russo presented no evidence

whatsoever that he was not on the premises subject to search pursuant to the
warrant when he was detained.
Even if he had presented evidence demonstrating that the officers
exceeded the scope of the search warrant when they searched his pockets and
discovered the cell phone, such search was justified as a search incident to
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arrest. 3 A search incident to arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant
requirement.

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).

The purpose of the

search incident to arrest is to remove weapons from the arrestee's control,
discover items that if left in the arrestee's control might facilitate an escape effort,
and seize evidence of crime. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 228-29
(1973). It is well established that a search incident to arrest is proper even if the
search precedes a formal arrest, so long as probable cause to arrest a suspect
exists at the time of the search. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980);
State v. Schwarz, 133 Idaho 463, 468, 988 P.2d 689, 694 (1999); State v.
Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 351, 194 P.3d 550, 555 (Ct. App. 2008); State v.
Gibson, 141 Idaho 277,282, 108 P.3d 424, 429 (Ct. App. 2005).
Because Russo does not challenge the search warrant on appeal, it is
undisputed in this case that the officers had, before they detained and searched
him, established probable cause to believe that Russo had committed several
rapes and that evidence in his possession, including a cell phone, would contain
evidence

of

those

rapes.

It

is

also

undisputed

that

Russo

was

contemporaneously detained, searched, handcuffed, put in a squad car, and
transported to the police station. (See 1/27/10 Tr., p. 70, L. 19; p. 75, Ls. 11-25.)
Because the officers had probable cause to arrest Russo at the time of his
detention and search, and probable cause to believe the phone contained

The district court mentioned the search incident to arrest warrant exception in
relation to whether the officers could search the cell phone once they had taken it
pursuant to the warrant, but ruled on this issue on a different basis. (1/27/10 Tr.,
p. 81, L. 22 - p. 82, L. 25.)
3
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evidence of a crime, the search of Russo and the seizure and search of the
phone were proper incident to arrest.
Finally, even if the search had not been authorized by the search warrant
and also if the search had not been a proper search incident to arrest, there
would have been no ground for suppression because the phone was subject to
the inevitable discovery doctrine.

The inevitable discovery doctrine is an

exception to the exclusionary rule. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 496, 36 P.3d
1278,1284 (2001); State v. Fancher, 145 Idaho 832,839,186 P.3d 688, 695 (Ct.
App. 2008); State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 101-102,57 P.3d 807, 812-813
(Ct. App. 2002). Under the inevitable discovery doctrine the exclusionary rule
does not apply to evidence found by improper methods if the preponderance of
the evidence establishes that the evidence inevitably would have been found by
lawful means. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984); Stuart, 136 Idaho at
497 -98, 36 P.3d at 1285-86.

The underlying rationale of this rule is that

suppression should leave the prosecution in the same position it would have
been absent the police misconduct, not a worse one. Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-44;
see also Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho at 102, 57 P.3d at 813.
Here the evidence establishes that Russo's arrest and search, leading to
police obtaining the phone, were inevitable. That evidence includes, but is not
limited to, that Russo was already a suspect in a string of sexual assaults in
various places in the Treasure Valley area (R., vol. I, pp. 125-31; 1/27/10 Tr., p.
55, Ls. 2-25; p. 74, Ls. 5-8); Russo had been previously convicted of rape in
Washington (R., vol. I, pp. 130-31); the rape of J.W., the other sexual assaults in
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Idaho, and the rape in Washington all bore significant similarities (R., vol. I, pp.
130-31); Russo had driven his motorcycle a considerable distance before 5:47
a.m. the morning of the rape (R., vol. I, pp. 131-32); the time frame and distance
between the rape in Caldwell and the arrival of officers at Russo's Meridian
apartment was consistent with Russo having ridden his motorcycle from the rape
scene to his home (R., vol. I, pp. 131-32; 1/27/10 Tr., p. 55, L. 23 - p. 56, L. 10;
p. 57, L. 15 - p. 58, L. 6; p. 74, Ls. 12-17); Russo was at about that time
laundering clothes that matched the description of clothes worn by the rapist (R.,
vol. I, pp. 153-54; 1/27/10 Tr., p. 72, L. 11 - p. 73, L. 1); and latex gloves similar
to those used by the rapist were found in the saddlebags of Russo's motorcycle
(R., vol. I, p. 135).

Even had the police not seized the cell phone in Russo's

pocket at the time of his detention, his arrest and search incident thereto were
inevitable.
Russo has failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress the
cell phone and its contents as evidence.

He has first failed to show that the

search and seizure of the cell phone were beyond the scope of the search
warrant. Second, the search was proper as incident to Russo's arrest. Finally,
even if the search had not been proper, the cell phone would have been
inevitably discovered based on Russo's arrest once the search pursuant to the
warrant was completed, and therefore the exclusionary rule was inapplicable.
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II.

Russo Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Evidentiary Ruling On
Prior Bad Act Evidence
A.

Introduction
The state moved to allow introduction of evidence: (1) that Russo had

committed other rapes; (2) that the other rapes, like the one charged, included
"the inability to maintain an erection, the use of gloves, the taking of the victim's
clothes, the use of weapons, and/or other distinguishing characteristics"; (3) that
Russo admitted rape fantasies; and (4) that Russo possessed pornographic
depictions of rape. (R., vol. I, pp. 44-72, 85-88.) Russo objected. (R., vol. I, pp.
81-84.) The district court excluded most of the evidence. (R., vol. II, pp. 175-76,
243; 3/18/10 Tr., p. 62, L. 8 - p. 79, L. 17.) It allowed, however, limited testimony
of how Russo came to be a suspect in the charged rape, evidence of Russo's
admissions of having rape fantasies, and evidence that Russo possessed rapethemed pornography. (R., vol. II, p. 175; 3/18/10 Tr., p. 67, L. 14 - p. 70, L. 14;
5/11/10 Tr., p. 24, L. 10 - p. 31, L. 3.)
At the trial Corporal Tonna Marek and Officer Brice King testified that they
suspected Russo shortly after the crime was reported and asked Ada County
officers to go to Russo's home, but, pursuant to the trial court's ruling, did not
state the basis for their suspicions. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 287, L. 9 - p. 290, L. 16; p.
489, L. 12 - p. 490, L. 6.)

Admission of this evidence is not challenged on

appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp. 23-29.)
Corporal Angela Weekes testified that she interviewed Russo three times.
(Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 19, Ls. 3-22; p. 38, L. 22 - p. 39, L. 5.) In one of the earlier
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interviews Russo "described watching pornography that depicted rape."
Tr., vol. II, p. 39, L. 24 - p. 41, L. 2.)

(Trial

He also described having violent rape

fantasies. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 41, L. 3 - p. 42, L. 9.) The state also presented
evidence that Russo possessed images depicting rapes (other than the one at
issue). (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 513, L. 13 - p. 519, L. 3; p. 522, L. 6 - p. 523, L. 11.)
Russo does claim that the district court erred by admitting this evidence.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 25-27.) Application of the law to the district court's ruling
shows no error.

B.

Standard Of Review
Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard:

whether the evidence is relevant for a purpose other than propensity is given free
review while the determination of whether the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.

State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569, 165 P.3d 273, 283

(2007). A trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony will not be
disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.

State v.

Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 645, 962 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1998); State v. Konechny,
134 Idaho 410, 414,3 P.3d 535, 539 (Ct. App. 2000).

C.

Russo Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Of Evidence That He
Possessed Depictions Of Rape And Admitted Having Fantasies Of
Committing Rape
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove a

defendant's criminal propensity." State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 146, 150, 254 P.3d
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47, 51 (Ct. App. 2011). Evidence that implicates a defendant's character, but is
also relevant to some permissible purpose such as those listed in the rule, is not
excluded under Rule 404(b)'s relevancy prong.
_, _

State v. Whitaker, _

Idaho

P.3d _,2012 WL 182115 *1 (Idaho App., 2012). Only if the probative

value of the challenged evidence is '''entirely dependent upon its tendency to
demonstrate the defendant's propensity to engage in such behavior'" will it be
deemed irrelevant to a proper purpose under the Rule. Gomez 151 Idaho at 152,
254 P.3d at 53 (emphasis original) (quoting State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,54,205
P.3d 1185, 1190 (2009)).
The evidence in this case is analogous to that held admissible in State v.
Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 215 P.3d 538 (Ct. App. 2009).

Rossignol was

charged with lewd conduct for having sexual contact with his daughter.
820-21, 215 P.3d at 540-41.

kl

at

The trial court admitted evidence that Rossignol

possessed child pornography and incest stories to prove intent, motive and plan.

kl

at 823, 215 P.3d at 543.

purposes.

Jit

Both were deemed properly admitted for those

at 823-25, 215 P.3d at 543-46.

Although evidence of the

pornography was admitted primarily to corroborate the victim's claim that
Rossignol showed her pornography, the "incest stories were relevant to the intent
element of the crimes Rossignol was charged with and to show Rossignol's
motive and plan to engage in sexual acts with his daughter."

Jit at 825, 215 P.3d

at 546. Like the incest stories in Rossignol, the rape fantasies and supporting
pornography were relevant to show Russo's intent, motive and plan.
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Courts in other jurisdictions are in agreement.

In State v. Brown, 710

S.E.2d 265, 271 (N.C. App. 2011), the court held admissible evidence that the
defendant was in possession of written depictions of incest in his trial for sexual
abusing his daughter.

The court distinguished cases generally holding that

evidence of pornography was not relevant to a proper purpose and rejected the
defense argument for a "broadly applicable rule with respect to the admissibility
of [evidence of] pornography in a criminal case."

kL at 166-69.

Rather, the court

compared that case to ones in which evidence of financial hardship or need was
admissible to prove motive in crimes for which the defendant expected to benefit
financially.

kL at 270.

The court then also found the evidence relevant to both

general and specific intent.

kL at 271-72.

In People v. Pelo, 942 N.E.2d 463, 483-86 (III. App. 4th Dist. 2010), the
court concluded that pornography "depicting primarily violence against women,
bondage, sadism, and rape" was relevant to prove the identity of the perpetrator
of violent sexual crimes against the victims. The pornography depicted the kinds
of acts "emulated by the perpetrator in these cases."

kL at 485-86.

As in Rossignol, Brown and Pelo, the evidence in question in this case
was admissible to prove intent and motive and, by extension, identity. Someone
who views depictions of rape for entertainment and titillation and who fantasizes
about committing rape is more likely to be a rapist than someone who finds those
acts repulsive.

Given the narrow scope of the evidence (limited to evidence

concerning fantasies of sexual violence against women and pornography
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depicting vaginal and oral rape) and how that evidence matched the facts of this
case, the evidence established motive, intent, and identity.
Russo argues it makes "little sense" to believe that evidence of
possession of pornography depicting rape and fantasizing about sexual violence
against women shows motive (the only possible relevance he sees in this case).
(Appellant's brief, pp. 26-27.)

He argues that whoever committed the rape

obviously had the motive of "sating his sexual urges" and therefore evidence that
Russo had sexual urges he wished to sate by rape was irrelevant. (Appellant's
brief, p. 27.) In the alternative, Russo argues that even if he "had a motive to
rape generally, this motive in no way connects him particularly" to the charged
rape. (Appellant's brief, p. 27.) It is Russo's argument, not the district court's
ruling, that makes "little sense."
In Rossignol evidence of written materials depicting as entertainment the
very type of crime Rossignol was charged with committing was relevant to show
his intent and motive.

Rossignol, 147 Idaho at 825, 215 P.3d at 546.

Idaho

precedent rejects the argument made by Russo.
In addition, in Brown, the court analogized evidence of possession of
materials promoting incest to evidence of potential for financial gain to find the
evidence relevant to motive. Brown, 710 S.E.2d at 270. "In each of these cases
where the defendant desired money, evidence of that desire was relevant to
show the defendant's motive in committing the acts underlying the offense."

kL.

In other words, a person who stands to gain financially from an act is more likely
to do that act than someone who lacks that motive.
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Likewise, someone who

fantasizes and seeks entertainment from depictions of rape is more likely to gain
(by "sating his sexual urges") by committing a rape than someone who at no time
contemplates such an act and would gain no such satisfaction from it. Indeed,
whoever committed the rape generally "emulated" the "acts and scenarios"
contained in Russo's fantasies and entertainment. Pelo, 942 N.E.2d at 485-86.
Such makes it more likely that the perpetrator was Russo.
In this case the perpetrator of this rape went to rather extravagant lengths
to hide his identity, including making sure the victim's eyes were covered during
the whole ordeal and taking bedding and using a series of condoms to prevent
leaving DNA evidence. The perpetrator also made sure to disable the victim's
cell phone to give himself additional time to escape. He took photographs of the
rape to be able to relive the event repeatedly. In short, whoever committed this
rape put a lot of thought and effort into its planning and execution. That Russo
spent time fantasizing about rape and seeking depictions of it for entertainment
demonstrates that he is more likely the rapist. 4
Where, as here, evidence is relevant to matters other than propensity, it is
admissible unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability of unfair prejudice. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 227,
230 (1999). Russo has failed to show any abuse of discretion in this weighing
process. Although there is certainly some risk of unfair prejudice arising from the

The state also asserts that the claimed error is necessarily harmless given the
overwhelming evidence of guilt, which included evidence that Russo had the
video of the rape on his cell phone. I.C.R. 52; State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho
463, 471, 163 P.3d 1175, 1183 (2007).
4
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disputed evidence, here the probative value was such that it was not
substantially outweighed by that danger.

In this case the specific parallels

between the fantasies and pornography and the act, all of which involved rape,
are apparent.

This both increases the probative value of the evidence and

reduces the potential for unfair prejudice. Rossignol, 147 Idaho at 825, 215 P.3d
at 545 (potential prejudice from evidence that Rossignol had materials depicting
type of crime he was charged with did not substantially outweigh probative
value); State v. Kremer, 144 Idaho 286,291-92, 160 P.3d 443,448-49 (Ct. App.
2007) ("distinct similarities" between challenged evidence and crimes charged
showed both relevance and lack of prejudice). Russo has failed to show error
under either prong of the I.R.E. 404(b) standard.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment.

DATED this 12th day of June, 2012.
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